Ever since Brentano's development of intentional psychology at the end of the nineteenth century, philosophers have turned to Aristotle's philosophical account of the soul with more than merely antiquarian interests in mind. In the last fifty years in particular, after the post-Rylean rebirth of the philosophy of mind, people have consistently turned to the compressed and complex discussion in DeAnima in order to discover the philosophical origins of their own developed notions of the mind. Aristotle has been hailed as a physicalist of a variety of types, a functionalist avant la lettre, as well as a more traditional sort of dualist.
mind can be discerned in a variety of ways within the essays presented here, although these issues are not immediately the subject of the essays. The contributors to the Bilingual Colloquium on Aristotle on Action and Imagination, which took place at McGill in December 1988, chose rather to concern themselves with a different set of issues in Aristotle's psychology, those broadly relating to the themes of the motivations of human (and animal) action, and of the role played in Aristotle's theory by the peculiar faculty he dubs phantasia, generally, although inadequately, rendered as "imagination."
Phantasia is perhaps least tendentiously, if crudely, to be considered as the faculty by which things seem to be of a certain kind to animals. Closely connected to perception, the operations of phantasia include memories, dreams, imaginings, illusions. It is in fact for Aristotle not so much a single faculty, as an umbrella of related psychological capacities; it has sometimes been doubted whether phantasia is coherent even as an umbrella. What does seem to be uncontroversial, however, is that the faculty, or net of faculties, is intrinsically and inextricably bound up with the conditions for animal action -and it is at least in part what accounts for the peculiar autonomy and goal-directedness that the motion of animals exhibits by contrast with that of the elements.
The papers in this collection address, in a variety of ways, and from a variety of perspectives, the strength and coherence of Aristotle's account of phantasia as part of an explanatory model for animal behaviour, from the simplest goal-directed movements of primitive life-forms to the complexities of human social organization. The study of phantasia, in Arisotle's treatment of it, turns out to be of critical importance not merely for his psychology and his action theory, but for his developed ethical, political, and aesthetic theories as well. We are the way we are (and hence we are good or bad) in virtue of our characters; and our characters are, on analysis, for Aristotle, a function of how things appear to be to us. Equally, it is only by having the psychological capacity for considering a variety of possible outcomes, and weighing their merits and demerits, that we ever attain the kind of autonomy of action that is required for genuinely moral behaviour, as well as for advanced forms of social organization. And these capacities for the consideration and evaluation of appearances play no less a role in the celebrated account of the psychological function of tragedy.
The contributions to this collection are diverse: those by Dugre, Hankinson and Hutchinson treat of issues in Aristotle's psychology, those of Bodeiis and Deslauriers of issues in his ethics, poetics and politics. But common to them is the belief that Aristotle's account of imagination and action, for all its difficulties, obscurities, and infuriatingly tantalizing lacunae is of great intrinsic interest; and that in the elucidation of it much is to be discovered of importance not merely for a fuller understanding of Aristotle's philosophy, but for philosophical psychology, construed in its broadest terms, in general.
